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STATUTORY REGULATION OF INSIDER
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DENNIS S. KARJALA*
Insider trading occurs when certain persons, through their position
in a corporation or their relationship to it, acquire material, nonpublic
information that relates to the value of the corporation's securities and
trade on it in order to profit when the information is eventually dis-
closed. Notwithstanding a respectable argument to the contrary,' most
courts and commentators agree that insider trading is undesirable and
must be regulated by law.2 Although the regulation of insider trading
in impersonal markets has received considerable attention,3 one analyt-
ical point has been largely ignored that nevertheless has significant pol-
icy implications for any attempt to rationalize the law of insider trading
* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.S.E. 1961, Princeton University; M.S.
1963, Ph.D 1965, University of Illinois; J.D. 1972 University of California (Berkeley).
1. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADINmO AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); Manne, Economic As-
pects of Required Disclosure under Federal Securities Laws, in WALL STREET IN TRANSITION
(1975). For a thorough analysis of this and related issues see Dooley, Enforcement oflnsder Trad-
ing Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REv. 1 (1980).
2. The regulation of insider trading presupposes that one can determine who is an insider,
when insider trading occurs, and how to measure the insider's unfair profit. Ratner, Federal and
State Roles in the Regulation oflnsider Trading, 31 Bus. LAW. 947, 947 (1976). The American Law
Institutes Federal Securities Code (FSC) gives considerable guidance here, see FED. SEC. CODE
§§ 1603(a)-(b), 1703(b), 1708(a)-(b) (1980), although some questions remain. Cf. Wolfson,
Chiarella and the Federal Securities Code, 4 CORP. L. REV. 249, 252-53 (1981) (arguing that the
FSC remains somewhat unclear on certain questions of tippee liability). The FSC's broad defini-
tion of an "insider," which encompasses virtually anyone who has privileged information by rea-
son of a relationship with the issuer, as well as tippees of such persons, is the best proposed to date.
See FED. SEC. CODE § 1603(b) (1980).
3. The term "impersonal markets" refers to the national stock exchanges and to at least the
relatively active portions of the over-the-counter market. Impersonal market transactions contrast
with face-to-face transactions, in which buyer and seller negotiate directly with one another. The
FSC defines an impersonal market transaction as one that "is effected in a manner that would
make the matching of buyers and sellers substantially fortuitous." FED. SEC. CODE § 1702(b) &
Comment 4 (1980). For a discussion of some of the ramifications of this anonymity, see infra
notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
627
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
through statutory reform.4 Few courts or commentators, if any, have
realized that the goals of a system that regulates insider trading neces-
sarily differ depending on whether the corporation in question has a
legitimate business reason for keeping the material information secret.
The failure to distinguish these varying goals may be one cause of the
continuing disagreement over policy that surrounds the prospect of
statutory reform. Furthermore, confusion over the proper goals of in-
sider trading regulation has produced a scheme for regulating- insider
trading in the Federal Securities Codes (FSC) that is both unnecessa-
rily complex and actually subversive of important regulatory ends.
Careful consideration of the possible goals of insider trading regu-
lation shows that certain goals are either irrelevant or impossible to
achieve if the corporation has a legitimate reason for nondisclosure.
Moreover, even if there is no legitimate reason for secrecy, the various
theoretically correct goals of insider trading regulation are not equally
feasible in practice. In its attempt to establish a rational framework to
analyze the insider trading problem, this article begins with a brief dis-
cussion of the various goals that must be considered in developing a
regulatory scheme. The relative importance of each goal is then estab-
lished by examining its legitimacy and feasibility, both when the corpo-
ration has a good reason for nondisclosure and when it does not. After
establishing the appropriate goals in each type of circumstance, this ar-
ticle examines the two most widely advocated schemes of private en-
forcement to determine which is more rationally related to these goals
and will most efficiently effect them.
These considerations demonstrate that, in most circumstances,
compensation is an inappropriate goal of insider trading regulation.
Moreover, even in those circumstances in which compensation is theo-
retically justified, it is either impossible to achieve or conflicts with
other, more important goals. Because in all circumstances compensa-
tion of individual shareholders is thus either inappropriate or impossi-
4. Parts XVI and XVII of the FSC pertain to insider trading. See infra text accompanying
notes 42-49. At present, insider trading is regulated most generally under rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1981), and the rule's judicially implied private right of action for certain injured
traders. The corporate cause of action advocated herein, see infra text accompanying notes 53-64,
would be barred by the purchaser/seller requirement of rule lOb-5, which was reaffirmed in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), because the corporation cannot be a
purchaser or seller of its own securities during the secrecy period without itself violating the an-
tifraud rules. Ratner, supra note 2, at 960, Comment, A Re-Evaluation of Federal and Stale Regu-
lation of Insider Trading on the Open Securities Market, 58 Wash. U.L.Q. 915, 942-43 (1980). For
a general treatment of the problem of applying rule lOb-5 to insider trading, see Dooley, supra
note I; Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Markets: Who Is
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Rule JOb-5?, 54 S. CAL L. REV. 1217 (1981).
5. FED. SEC. CODE (1980).
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ble, this article concludes that the sole private claim against the insider
for damages6 should lie in the corporation, whether or not the corpora-
tion had a legitimate reason for nondisclosure at the time of the illegal
trading. This specific conclusion may remain open to debate, but the
analysis of the goals of insider trading regulation in varying circum-
stances clarifies the issues around which the debate should revolve. 7
I. GOALS OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATION
There are several possible purposes for insider trading regulation.
If anyone is injured as a result of insider trading, the law should pro-
vide a means by which the injured party can obtain redress; therefore,
compensation of injured parties is arguably an important goal in con-
structing a regulatory scheme. A second goal follows from the widely
held assumption that insider trading in securities of publicly held com-
panies, which almost invariably takes place in impersonal markets, in-
jures the market by causing investors to lose confidence in the integrity
of the system.8 No one has provided a formula for measuring this sup-
posed injury to the market, and the allegations of harm may reflect
nothing more precise than the moral position that insider trading is bad
and must be regulated. Nevertheless, the assumption that such injury
occurs makes deterrence a fundamental objective. Third, insofar as in-
sider trading is considered simply wrongful activity, punishment of the
wrongdoers and disgorgement of their unfair profits become important
6. In this context the word "damages" does not imply that the recipient has been injured or
has suffered a loss; it is simply shorthand for whatever monetary award the law may give to a
private plaintiff.
7. The specific recommendation of this article--that a private right of action for damages
should be recognized only in the corporation whose shares were traded-has been made before,
but on different analysis. See Knauss, Disclosure Requirements-Changing Concepts of Liability,
24 Bus. LAw. 43, 58-59 (1968) (recommending that the corporate claim supplement the possibility
of enforcement action by the SEC, with payment of unfair insider profits to the corporation in
either case); Ratner, supra note 2, at 957-60, Sommer, Rule 10b-5: Notesfor Legislation, 17 W.
REsERvE L. REv. 1029, 1047-49 (1966); Comment, Fashioning a Lidfor Pandora's Box: .4 Legi-
mate Rolefor Rule 1Ob-5in P'vate.4ctions-4gainst Insider Trading on a National Stock Exchange,
16 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 404, 415 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Pandoras Box]; Comment,
supra note 4, at 942-43.
8. Two cases that differ sharply on the degree of civil liability insider traders should incur
agree, nevertheless, that protecting the "integrity of the market" is a key feature of rule lOb-5's
prohibition of insider trading. Compare Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
495 F.2d 228, 237 (2d Cir. 1974) with Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 318 (6th Cir. 1976), cer.
denied, 429 U.S. 1053 (1977); see also Branson, Discourse on the Supreme Court Approach to SEC
Rule lOb-S andInsider Trading, 30 EMORY LJ. 263, 295-97 (1981); Rapp, Fridrich v. Bradford and
the Scope ofInsider Trading Liability Under SECRule 10b-5: Commentary, 38 OnIo ST. L.J. 67,
70 (1977); Note, Damages to Uninformed Tradersfor Insider Trading on Impersonal Exchanges, 74
COLUM. L. Ray. 299, 317 (1974); Comment, Insider Trading Without Disclosure-Theory of Liabil-
ity, 28 OHIo ST. L.J. 472, 479 (1967).
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aims of the regulatory system. Finally, inducing rapid public disclo-
sure of material information is a fourth possible goal of any system that
regulates insider trading.
These goals are not all feasible, or even appropriate, in all circum-
stances. For example, the goal of rapid public disclosure of material
information is irrelevant when the corporation has a legitimate busi-
ness purpose for secrecy. Nor is compensation an appropriate regula-
tory goal under such circumstances because a compensatory award
presupposes a causal relationship between the wrongful act of trading
and the injured party's loss. If a corporation has a legitimate business
purpose for keeping material information secret, insider trading on that
information causes no identifiable injury to those persons who have
been the primary subject of judicial and academic concern-persons
who trade in the opposite direction from the insider before the news
becomes public ("losing market traders" or "market losers"). 9 To the
extent that losing market traders make independent decisions to enter
the market in the security at the then-prevailing market price, they do
not suffer any injury that can be causally related to the insider's wrong-
ful act. The requisite causal relationship does exist if the losing market
trader's transaction is induced by the insider's activity ("induced trad-
ers"),'0 but it is not possible as a practical matter to identify such trad-
ers. Similarly, persons who would have traded in the same direction as
the insider, but whose potential purchases or sales were preempted by
the insider's trading activity ("preempted traders"), suffer losses caused
by insider trading. Again, however, there is no reliable method for
identifying such traders. Finally, there are those traders who make an
independent decision to trade in the same direction as the insiders and
who fortuitously reap benefits from the subsequent price change ("win-
ning market traders"). Winning market traders are identifiable, and, to
the extent that insider trading affects the market price before disclosure
of the secret information, they suffer losses in the form of lower fortui-
tous gains than they would have.made had the insiders abstained from
trading." However, the amount of their loss is not easily identified,
nor does it bear any relationship to the amount of the insiders' profits.
Thus, when the corporation has a legitimate business purpose for
nondisclosure of material information, insider trading on the informa-
tion causes no injury to most losing market traders and injures uniden-
tifiable induced and preempted traders, as well as identifiable winning
9. See infra text accompanying notes 24-31.
10. The terminology "induced" and "preempted" traders is that of Professor Wang. See
Wang, supra note 4, at 1230-40.
11. See infra notes 26, 32-34 and accompanying text.
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market traders, to an undeterminable extent. Under these circum-
stances, compensating innocent investors for their losses is either un-
warranted or impossible and cannot stand as an appropriate goal of the
regulatory system. This conclusion has specific implications for the de-
sign of a regulatory scheme: the goal of compensation does not justify
a statutory civil action for damages when the corporation has a legiti-
mate business reason for secrecy.
One -might still want to allow a civil action for damages against
inside traders in service of some of the other regulatory goals. Deter-
rence and punishment, for example, could perhaps be increased by au-
thorizing losing market traders, or some subset of them, to sue the
illegally trading insiders for statutorily defined money damages. If de-
terrence and punishment are its goals, however, the regulatory scheme
ought to be rationally related to their achievement. Some courts, 12 with
approval by commentators,13 have awarded to losing market traders
damages measured by the difference between the uninformed investor's
transaction price and the value of the security after the information
became public. Such a system can easily result in a total award many
times greater than the insider's illegal profit. The award is not merely a
windfall to losing market traders whose losses are causally unrelated to
the wrong; it completely overwhelms any purported disgorgement prin-
ciple and is without basis in any rational theory of punishment, because
the damages bear no relationship to the insider's wrongful acts.14
When a corporation has no legitimate purpose for nondisclosure
of material information, insider trading on the information directly
causes injury to identifiable losing market traders in some cases.' 5
12. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd, 635 F.2d
156 (2d Cir. 1980); Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,377 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1975); Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306
F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Because both Shapiro and Astor involved motions concerning the
validity of plaintiffs' claims against the trading insiders, neither court had to take the final step of
actually imposing liability in excess of defendants' wrongful gains. Elkind did raise this problem,
however, in a particularly poignant setting. It was an action against the company for tipping by its
officers to outsiders who traded. Thus, the defendant was two levels removed from the actual
profiteering. Although there were tippee profits of approximately thirty to forty thousand dollars,
the district court awarded damages to all persons trading in the opposite direction during the
secrecy period, untroubled that the total award might reach $740,000. 472 F. Supp. at 135. Such
"draconian damages," however, were too much even for the Second Circuit, 635 F.2d at 170,
which did not change the standards for membership in the plaintiff class but did limit total dam-
ages to the amount of the tippees' unfair profit. Id. at 172-73. Thus, the Second Circuit's ap-
proach is now essentially that of the FSC. See infra text accompanying notes 42-49.
13. See generally Rapp, supra note 8.
14. See Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 170 (2d Cir. 1980); Dooley, supra note
1, at 22-24, 66.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 69-72.
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Compensation of these losses is therefore an appropriate theoretical
goal of the regulatory scheme. However, most of these losses represent
gains, not to the insider, but to fortuitous winning market traders who
have committed no wrongful act. As a result, requiring the insider to
recompense losing traders for the full amount of their damages may
seem overly punitive despite the causal relationship. An alternative
regulatory scheme might limit the class of private claimants to losing
market traders who, quite fortuitously, happen to be "matched" with
the insider by the exchange specialist or market maker and who are
thereby in direct privity of contract with the insider. This scheme re-
stricts maximum theoretical damages to the amount of the insider's
wrongful profit, but suffers from a disconcerting arbitrariness in that
those persons who turn out to be in privity of contract with the insider
cannot be rationally distinguished from any other losing market traders
as to how or whether they suffered losses.16 Furthermore, even a sys-
tem that could actually insure liability up to the amount of the insider's
wrongful profit17 might be an insufficient deterrent because the worst
that could happen to the inside trader would be that he would lose his
profit, plus his costs of suit, if he were caught.18
Many commentators have sensed these problems, but to resolve
them they usually implicitly assume that the corporation in question
has a justifiable reason for secrecy during the period in Which the insid-
ers are trading in the market. They then conclude-quite correctly on
the basis of their assumption-that the absence of demonstrable harm
to individual losing market traders implies that the proper goals of the
regulatory scheme are deterrence, punishment, and general protection
of the integrity of the market.'9 That the goals themselves might differ
depending on the circumstances of the company and the type of infor-
16. Comment, Pandora's Box, supra note 7, at 408-09.
17. The difficulty of "matching" buyers and sellers who trade on a national securities ex-
change makes it unlikely that many people who could be said to have traded directly with the
insider will ever know they did and bring suit. Id.
18. See, eg., Note, Common Law Corporate Recoveryfor Trading on Non-Public Information,
74 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 296 (1974); Comment, Pandora's Box supra note 7, at 417. See in.fra text
accompanying notes 39-41.
19. E.g., Note, supra note 8, at 310-11; Note, Limiting the PlaintffgClass: Rule JOb-.5 andthe
Federal Securities Code, 72 MICH. L. REv. 1398, 1429 (1974); Comment, Pandora's Box, supra
note 7, at 412; Comment, Civil Liability Under Section 1OB and Rule 10B-5: A Suggestion for
Replacing the Doctrine ofPrivity, 74 YAiE LJ. 658, 677-79 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
CivilLiability]. The absence-of-harm analysis is correct only insofar as it applies to losing market
traders who are not induced traders. Induced traders, as well as preempted traders, are harmed as
a result of insider trading, see supra text accompanying note 10, but only Professor Wang has
made this distinction. See infra notes 27-28 and accompanying text. Winning market traders also
suffer harm, but the possibility ofrecmpensing their losses is rarely discussed. See infra notes 32-
34 and accompanying text.
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mation involved has received little or no consideration. Nevertheless,
identifiable individual losing market traders are in fact harmed when
the corporation unjustifiably delays disclosing material information. In
these circumstances compensation is arguably a primary goal of regula-
tion. Because the goals of regulation are different when a corporation
has a legitimate reason for secrecy and when it does not, distinguishing
these cases will clarify the argument over the proper means of regula-
tion and point toward a solution that is rationally related to all appro-
priate social goals.
II. REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING WHEN THE CORPORATION
HAS A JUSTIFIABLE REASON FOR SECRECY
A. Appropriate Regulatory Goals.
The internal machinery of large corporations often generates ma-
terial information that, for legitimate business purposes, cannot imme-
diately be disclosed to the public. The classic example appears in SEC
v. Texas Guff Sulphur Co.20 In that case, the company was engaged in
delicate negotiations for mineral rights, and disclosure of the explora-
tory discoveries would have adversely affected its bargaining position.
The much-heralded "disclose or abstain" rule of Texas Guf Sulphur
recognizes that there are legitimate reasons for secrecy; thus the rule
condones nondisclosure as long as the insider abstains from trading.2'
Courts have recognized that harm can flow as easily from public re-
lease of unverified or incorrect reports as from failure to disclose cor-
rect reports of new developments, and they have generally held that, in
the absence of insider trading, the timing of disclosure is a matter
within management's discretion.22
Determining the circumstances in which a corporation has a legiti-
mate business need for secrecy, and separating them from those in
which it does not, is a very difficult problem.3 Commentators agree,
20. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
21. Id. at 848; see also In re Investors Mgt Co., 44 S.E.C. 633, 646 (1971); Brudney, Insiders,
Outsiders, and Infornational Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REv.
322, 337-38 (1979); Comment, Pandora's Box, supra note 7, at 405.
22. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnel Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 518 (10th
Cir.), cert denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 850 n.12 (2d
Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123,
127-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), rev'd in part on other grounds, 635 F,2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980); Segal v.
Coburn Corp. of Am., [1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 94,002 at 94,020
(E.D.N.Y. April 30, 1973).
23. It is precisely this difficulty that makes implication of a general obligation to disclose
under rule lOb-5 so troublesome. Compare Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation's Aff5=naave
Duty to Disclose, 67 GEo. I.. 935, 989 (1979) (arguing in favor of rule lOb-5 liability for nondis-
closure absent a valid reason therefor, or at least a good faith effort to disclose) with Comment,
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however, that there is sometimes a legitimate need for secrecy,24 and
some have argued that when nondisclosure is justifiable no losing mar-
ket trader is harmed by insider trading.25 These commentators reason
that when the secret information ultimately becomes public the market
price of the securities will change, resulting in sudden losses for some
traders and sudden gains for others. Because the nondisclosure is justi-
fiable, however, the public unavailability of the secret information is
independent of the insider's decision to trade on it. Therefore, the los-
ing market traders' losses are caused solely by their own independent
investment decisions to buy or sell at the particular times they did. In
fact, the argument goes, insider trading activity can only help losing
market traders. For example, if insider purchases based on favorable
secret information have any effect on the market, it must be .to increase
the price. As a consequence, losing market traders who have decided
independently to sell their shares might receive a slightly higher price
than they would receive had the insider trading not occurred. The for-
tuitous gains by the winning market traders (those who trade in the
same direction as the insider) will be correspondingly reduced. Simi-
larly, if insider selling activity based on adverse inside information has
any effect on the market, it will decrease the price, and any market
trader who has independently decided to purchase the securities in
question at that time may pay a lower price.2 6 Insider trading, insofar
as it affects the market, causes it to reflect the value of the secret infor-
mation, and any losing market trader's loss results from the legitimate
nondisclosure of the information by the corporation, rather than from
the insider trading activity.
Professor Wang has demonstrated, however, that this argument is
not quite correct. 27 Even if most outsiders' investment decisions are
truly independent of insider trading activity, in the sense that the same
decisions would have been made notwithstanding any price changes
resulting from insider purchases or sales, they cannot all be independ-
ent. Professor Wang's "Law of Conservation of Securities"28 states that
the securities purchased by insiders are no longer held by outsiders.
Disclosure ofMaterial Inside Informatioxn An AffYnative Corporate Duy?, 1980 ARIZ. ST. LJ.
795, 805-08 (arguing against a rule requiring disclosure absent a valid business purpose, on the
grounds that the vagueness of the business purpose test makes the potentially astronomical liabil-
ity unfair, that it might force premature disclosure to the detriment of the corporation, and that it
would be unlikely in any event to improve corporate disclosure).
24. E.g., Dooley, supra note 1, at 32, 63-64.
25. Id. at 33; Note, supra note 8, at 306; Comment, Pandora's Box, supra note 7, at 409-10;
Comment, Civil Liabiliy, supra note 19, at 675-76.
26. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 949, 956; Note, supra note 8, at 306 n.62.
27. Wang, supra note 4, at 1230-40.
28. Id. at 1234-35, 1248.
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Therefore, somp outside person or group does not participate in the
benefits of the subsequent price rise when the good news is announced.
By carefully considering the actual dynamics of trading transactions in
impersonal markets, Professor Wang significantly refines the analysis
of who is harmed by insider trading. He shows that the persons injured
by insider trading activity are either induced traders, preempted trad-
ers, or some combination thereof. If these injured persons could be
identified. it would seem appropriate to permit them to sue the insiders
for damages measured by the difference between the price at which
they traded-or would have traded but for the preemption-and the
price after the news becomes public. 2 9 Unfortunately, identification of
those injured requires subjective motivational analysis not only of all
actual traders, but even of potential traders-clearly an impossible
task.30 To permit all losing market traders to sue for differential dam-
ages would allow compensation to induced traders, but it would also
give a cause of action the large group of traders whose investment deci-
sions were truly independent of the insider trading activity. Such a
remedy would not only be overinclusive but probably overly punitive
29. This analysis also provides a theoretical basis for limiting damage claims against the
insider to the amount of his profit. On good news, the insider withdraws from the market some
number of shares at some low price. Absent the insider trading, those shares would be held by the
persons selling to the insider, by persons who would have bought the shares had they not been
preempted by the insider's purchase, by persons who would not have sold unless induced by the
insider purchases, or by some combination of such persons. None of these persons are identifi-
able; nevertheless they were injured because they either sold or failed to buy at the price paid by
the insiders. (Of course, many of the preempted traders, had they been able to buy, might have
resold before the good news was made public. But the persons buying from them, or their trans-
ferees, would have made up the difference between the preempted traders' potential profit and the
inside traders' actual profit, omitting transaction costs.) The total loss to this large group of
unidentifiable outsiders who are injured by the insider trading activity must therefore be very
close to the insiders' profit. In fact, deviations from exact congruence could seemingly come only
from induced selling losses caused by a generally increased volume in the security resulting from
the insider's initial activity. But this type of induced loss is very much like an ordinary investment
risk. to the extent that the shares are not acquired by an insider, they are presumably taken up by
equally innocent induced purchasers; it is a zero sum game wherein innocent losses are offset by
innocent gains. Purchases and sales can be and often are induced by unusual but legal market
activity, therefore, this subset of induced losses arguably ought not be compensated. It is not
market activity, as such, that is the focus of insider trading regulation, but rather the perceived
unfairness of the insider's making a sure profit while all other investors are subject to risk. Focus-
ing only on the shares the insider has removed from the market thus leads to the conclusion that
the damages the insider causes to induced and preempted traders exactly equals the insider's
profits.
30. See Wang, supra note 4, at 1237, 1251, 1254. Although some may question the strict
interpretation of the purchaser/seller requirement under rule lOb-5 as applied to the specific facts
of Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (a well-defined group of offerees
was induced by a falsely pessimistic prospectus to reject an offer to purchase valuable stock), the
rule certainly has merit in circumstances that do not limit the number of persons who might later
claim that they would have acted differently had they had more, or more accurate, information.
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as well. It would, at the same time, be underinclusive by failing to
provide for recovery by preempted traders although their losses are
caused by insider trading.31 Therefore, as theoretically desirable as it
may be to provide a means to compensate those injured by the wrong-
ful activity-induced and preempted traders-the extreme difficulty of
identifying these injured parties makes compensation an impossible
goal.
Winning market traders are an identifiable group, and their losses
are directly caused by insider trading. These traders make an in-
dependent investment decision 32 to trade in the same direction as the
insiders, and their fortuitous gains are therefore reduced by the amount
that the insider trading affects the price at which they trade. Unfortu-
nately, compensation of this loss requires a measurement of the extent
to which the insider trading activity actually affects the price, which is
probably impossible to determine.33 Moreover, the litigated cases show
no inclination on the part of market winners to assert such claims
against the insiders, and few if any commentators have shown any sym-
pathy for their plight.34 This attitude suggests that whatever moral
principle underlies the prohibition against insider trading, it is not
aimed at protecting this class of investors. Compensation for their re-
duced winnings, therefore, is neither possible nor desirable, and the
regulatory system need not be designed to compensate them.
If a corporation has a legitimate business purpose for keeping ma-
terial information secret, and no insider trades on the information, all
losses are the result of the legitimate nondisclosure-an ordinary mar-
ket risk. The presence of insider trading does not affect the status of
these losses, except when the insider activity induces the losers to trade
31. Wang, supra note 4, at 1237, 1251, 1254.
32. No induced market winner-one whose trade is induced by the increased activity that
results from insider trading-has any complaint here. Absent the insider trading activity, these
induced market winners would have no gains at all; they can hardly complain that their gains
were reduced by the insider trading. Of course, to the extent that induced market winners exist,
the independently trading market winners cease to be readily identifiable, which would be another
reason for denying them any recovery. I assume, however, that the relative number of induced
market winners is small.
33. Any losses suffered by the winners are caused by changes in market price resulting from
the insider trading activity. There may often be no measurable change, and in any event the loss
bears no relationship to the amount of the insider's unfair profit. Therefore, granting a limited
claim for the amount of the insider's profit (or some multiple thereof) to the winners is no more
rational than granting it to the losers. A claim by the winners for actual damages makes more
sense theoretically, although problems of proof (showing the effect of the insider trading activity
on market price) might make it impractical. This may be why market winners have not heretofore
asserted such claims.
34. To give a private disgorgement claim against the insiders to the market winners would
add insult to the investment-risk injury suffered by the market losers.
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or preempts their trading. Yet it is not possible to identify these losers
and compensate their losses. Therefore, compensation is simply not an
appropriate goal of insider trading regulation when the corporation has
a legitimate business purpose for keeping the material information se-
cret. It is also obvious that rapid public disclosure of the information
cannot be a goal of the regulatory system in these circumstances, as it
would contradict the hypothesis that the corporation needs to keep the
information secret. Nor has anyone demonstrated that the supposed in-
jury to the market caused by insider trading can be even roughly mea-
sured by the extent of the losing market traders' losses.3 5 Only
deterrence, disgorgement of unfair profits, and punishment remain
plausible goals of the regulation of insider trading in impersonal mar-
kets when the corporation has justifiable business reasons for secrecy.
Therefore, the better regulatory scheme will be one that provides an
optimal combination of deterrence, disgorgement, and punishment, re-
gardless of any compensatory effects.
B. Aiming at the Goals Through Private Rights ofActioa
The goals of deterrence, disgorgement, and punishment are served
only in proportion to the efficiency of the enforcement mechanism. In
other words, the more likely it is that insider trading will result in a
lawsuit, the more likely it is that the insider will be punished and will
have to disgorge his unfair profit; the degree of deterrence will presum-
ably be higher as well. Therefore, evaluating various regulatory
schemes is simply a matter of determining which would result in the
greatest degree of efficient enforcement.3 6 Assuming that a private
claim is a desirable supplement to the various enforcement mechanisms
available to the government,37 one may compare the approach of the
FSC, which permits losing market traders to bring a private action for a
limited amount, with a scheme that gives a private claim for the same
35. Indeed, no one has defined the supposed injury in terms sufficiently concrete to permit
even a conceptual estimate of the damages. One indication of the difficulty is that a significant
number of innocent outsiders profit, albeit fortuitously, from the delay in disclosure. The market
losers' anger and frustration may undermine their confidence in the market, but this harm may be
offset by the satisfaction of the fortuitous market winners and their corresponding enthusiasm for
the market system. There is no formula by which to measure and compare these hypothetical
effects. Moreover, the losers' anger is most properly directed inward, because most of their losses
are the result of their own investment decisions. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text. It
is not clear that the integrity of the market is increased by redirecting that anger toward trading
insiders, falsely implying that their illegal actions caused the losses.
36. See Note, supra note 8, at 315.
37. Egregious cases, of course, may call for criminal sanctions, but these sanctions seem
clearly separable from the civil regulatory scheme.
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limited amount solely to the corporation, to determine which would
result in more efficient enforcement. 38
Whether the cause of action lies with the individual or the corpo-
ration, determination of the proper amount of the claim remains
largely a subjective matter. Disgorgement of the insider's unfair
profit-measured by the difference between his transaction price and
the value of the security after full disclosure, reduced perhaps by inter-
im fluctuations caused by sources unrelated to the secret information-
seems to be the minimum that almost any commentator on this subject
would require. A scheme requiring no more than disgorgement of the
unfair profit, however, might not be a sufficiently strong deterrent to
insider trading. The insider could trade in the hope that he would not
be caught, knowing that even if he were caught his net loss would only
be the cost bf litigation. Many insiders might consider this a good gam-
ble. Some commentators have therefore suggested that punitive dam-
ages should be available,39 and others have argued for multiple
damages, that is, private claims equaling some multiple of the amount
of the insider's unfair profit5 ° The line between a system that provides
too little deterrence and one that is overly punitive is not an easy one to
draw. Absent better empirical evidence than is now available, where
that line is placed may depend largely on one's view of just how bad
insider trading really is. In this sense the decision may be essentially
arbitrary.41 Assuming that the appropriate amount of the private
claim has been decided and is fixed by some statutory formula, the
38. A third possibility that has received some support in the literature is to permit the SEC
itself to recover the amount of the claim against the illegally trading insiders, partially on the
theory that the regulatory effort could finance itself once the SEC started collecting insider profits,
perhaps in multiples. E.g., Note, supra note 8, at 316; see also Knauss, supra note 7, at 58-59;
Ratner, supra note 2, at 954-55. The basic question is how to achieve the greatest degree of en-
forcement, however, and it is far from clear that even a larger government agency could discover
and sift through the myriad of potential violations as efficiently as private attorneys hoping to earn
a contingency fee. See in.fra text accompanying notes 65-66. Nor is it clear that the SEC would
make better use of the money, especially any amounts in excess of its enforcement costs, than
private parties who might reinvest it. Such a scheme could be an interesting experiment, but this
article concentrates on the less radical approaches.
39. See Ratner, supra note 2, at 961-62; Note, supra note 18, at 295-96; Comment, Pandora's
Box, supra note 7, at 417-20.
40. The changes to the official draft of the FSC, to which the SEC agreed, give the court
discretion to increase damages up to 50%. FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(b)(4)(C) (Supp. I 1981). See
also Pozen, An Overview of the Proposed Code's Treatment of Private Causes o( Action and Dam-
ages, 1 PACE L. REv. 355, 364 & n.33 (1981). A leading Japanese securities law scholar, who
advocates deterrence of insider trading, increased compensation to victims, and encouragement of
rapid public disclosure, has similarly recommended a statute that would provide double damages
plus an amount equal to 10% of the damages per day from the day the insider first trades until the
information becomes public. Tatsuta, A Proposed Statute Regulating Insider Trading and Com-
mentary Thereto, 746 SHOJIHOMU 2, 7-8 (1976) (in Japanese).
41. Cf. Pozen, supra note 40, at 364 (pointing out that any specific limit on the damage multi-
ple will necessarily be arbitrary, but should be large enough to provide a deterrent).
INSIDER TRA4DING
question remains: who should be permitted to bring the civil action to
recover that amount?
1. The FSC Approach and Its Problems. Section 1603(a) of the
FSC42 is the basic provision that makes insider trading unlawful in
both face-to-face transactions and impersonal markets. An insider who
violates section 1603(a) in an impersonal market is liable under section
1703(b) 43.to all market traders who trade in the opposite direction from
the day the insider first illegally trades until the information becomes
generally available. Damages to each market trader are determined by
the difference between the trading price and the value of the security a
reasonable time after the information becomes public,44 but total dam-
ages are limited to the insider's profit, measured in the same way as the
plaintiffs' losses. 45 The FSC also provides for the consolidation of all
actions against a single defendant46 and notice to all potential plain-
tiffs.47 Proration of the limited claim among all plaintiffs43 is required
unless the expense of proration appears unwarranted, in which case the
amount of the claim goes to the corporation or to the Securities Inves-
tor Protection Corporation. 49
Whatever degree of enforcement the apportioned-claim approach
of the FSC might achieve would not come without significant cost.
First, the apportionment provision obscures the proper goals of the reg-
ulatory scheme by making it appear that compensation of trading
42. FED. SEc. CODE § 1603(a) (1980).
43. Id. § 1703(b).
44. Id § 1708(a)-(b). The measure of damages is reduced to the extent "that the defendant
proves that the violation did not cause the loss...." Id. § 1708(b)(2). This creates a potential
loophole in the overall scheme of the FSC. The reduction of damages provided by section
1708(b)(2) arguably permits total escape from liability for insider trading because the insider trad-
ing as such does not cause identifiable injury to most losing market traders. See supra text accom-
panying notes 25-32. Of course, in order to carry his burden of proof, the defendant may have to
prove that the plaintiffs are not induced traders, but this may be possible, at least to the extent that
the plaintiffs respond honestly on deposition. At the very least, it might result in the disqualifica-
tion of the named plaintiffs as class representatives and thereby retard the progress of the litiga-
tion. C)n the other hand, the number of persons Vho are eligible plaintiffs until disqualified may
be so large that, with damages limited by section 1708(b)(3), many defendants may simply not
raise the causation issue. In any event, given the general irrelevance of compensation to the class
claim, there seems to be little justification for any causation defense as applied to section 1603(b).
45. FaD. SEC. CoDn § 1708(b)(3) (1980). But see supra note 40.
46. Id. § 1711(a)-(e).
47. Id. § 1711(h).
48. Id. § 17110)(1).
49. Id. § 17110)(2)-(3).
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losses is--or even can be-a significant goal of the system. 50 The FSC
goes through all the motions of a class action aimed at compensating
losing market traders for their losses, notwithstanding the absence of
any identifiable injury related to the wrong. As with all class action
litigation, suits against inside traders under the FSC would require ex-
pensive and time consuming procedures for notice, collection, proof of
claims, and distribution of apportioned damages. The immense recov-
ery that motivates many class action lawyers to take on these proce-
dural complexities, however, has been eliminated. Furthermore, the
amount eventually awarded to individual class members will usually be
no more than a small part of their total losses. The small recovery
results from the fact that most of these losses represent gain, not to the
insider, but to winning market traders who happened to be in the mar-
ket during the secrecy period. The plaintiff class members are unlikely
to feel that this is a satisfactory result.5 ' Doubtless, losing investors will
be disappointed when the secret information becomes public, but this is
true whether or not insider trading has taken place. To revive the
losers' hopes with all the publicity that surrounds class action litigation,
only to dash them again later with a mere nominal recovery, may only
serve to increase disappointment, 52 and further undermine investor
confidence in the securities markets.
50. The confusion over compensation as a goal of the system is exacerbated by the commen-
tary to the FSC: "The theory, again, is compensation if practicable but in any event deterrence
and avoidance of unjust enrichment." Id. § 1711(j), Comment 7(a).
51. Of course, doubling or trebling the damages will make the losing market traders feel
better, but this alternative loses sight of the proper goals. Any multiple damages provision should
serve the purpose of increased deterrence, not compensation. see supra note 41 and accorapany-
ing text. If the proper object is to make the losers feel better, which is another way of saying they
deserve compensation for their losses, there is no reason for stopping arbitrarily at some fraction.
On the other hand, if the sole object is enforcement of the disgorgement penalty, any recovery by
market losers must be considered wholly incidental to the enforcement mechanism. If the private
action in market losers for limited damages has the defect that it increases grumbling because of
nominal recovery, we should not compound the defect with the mistake of increasing the amount
of the claim to an overly punitive level. The remedy rather is to eliminate the underlying cause of
the grumbling in the first place, which is the unnecessary private claim in market losers who have
not suffered from the wrong being rectified.
52. Their pecuniary disappointment will probably outweigh whatever subjective satisfaction,
if any, they derive from being direct participants in punishing the insider via the class action. It is
perhaps an open question whether the FSC approach ameliorates or exacerbates the disappoint-
ment problem. It revives the hopes of losing market traders through notice of, and participation
in, the class action but permits the possibility of zero recovery where the amounts awarded to the
small investors do not warrant prorating the claim. See supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
Moreover, the drafters of the FSC do apparently visualize drawing some line between large and
small claimants that would permit recovery of the apportioned amounts by large investors while
ignoring the small investors. FED. SEC. CODE § 1711(j) Comment 7(b) (1980). This provision
certainly seems well designed to increase any latent feelings among small public investors that the
law only takes care of the big guys.
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2. An Alternative Proposal The Corporate Claim Ap-
proach. Instead of taking the FSC approach, a federal regulatory
scheme could authorize a corporate cause of action against insiders
who trade in the corporation's securities on the basis of privileged in-
formation when the corporation has a legitimate reason for secrecy.
Section 1714 of the FSC,53 like section 16(b) of the 1934 Act,54 provides
a corporate cause of action for the recovery of short-swing profits from
a limited subset of inside traders.5" The alternative suggested here
would apply the approach of section 16(b), but would authorize a cor-
porate cause of action against all inside traders for the recovery of their
illegal profits. It would at the same time deny a private action for dam-
ages to losing market traders, at least when nondisclosure was justified
by a legitimate business purpose. In effect, this corporate claim ap-
proach would codify the holding, if not the rationale, of Diamond v.
Oreamuno.56 In Diamond the New York Court of Appeals allowed a
corporate recovery through a shareholder's derivative suit against of-
ficers and directors who traded on inside information. The Diamond
court reasoned that inside information is a corporate asset and that, by
their abuse of this asset, the defendants breached their fiduciary duty to
the corporation.5 7 The court also conjectured that insider trading in-
jures a corporation's reputation and thereby undermines the value of its
securities.58 Proof of actual damage to the corporation is unnecessary
under Diamond because the underlying purpose of the disgorgement
remedy is deterrence rather than compensation.59
The Diamond doctrine has not been widely accepted; there are se-
rious problems with both the corporate asset theory and the hypothesis
that insider trading damages the corporation.60 In any event, a state
53. FED. SEC. CODE § 1714 (1980).
54. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1976).
55. Following section 16(b), FSC section 1714 only applies where the inside trader is a direc-
tor, an officer, or an owner of more than 10% of the shares of the corporation. FED. SEC. CODE
605(a), 1714(a).
56. 24 N.Y.2d 494, 248 N.E.2d 910, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969). Diamond, however, did not
reject the private claim in individual losing market traders. By itself, therefore, it creates the
possibility of double liability, which has engendered considerable criticism. Eg., Freeman v.
Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978); see generally R. JENNINGS & R. BUXBAUM, CORPORATIONS
605-11 (1979).
57. See also Note, supra note 18, at 285 & n.82; Note, From Brophy to Schein: Muddled
Thinking Excellent Result, I J. CORP. LAW 83, 92-93 (1975).
58. 24 N.Y.2d at 499, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81-82.
52. Id. at 498, 248 N.E.2d at 912, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
60. Compare Schein v. Chasen, 478 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1973), vacated and remanded sub nomi.
Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974) with Freeman v. Decio, 584 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1978)
and Schein v. Chasen, 313 So.2d 739 (Fla. 1975). The Diamond doctrine has some force when
applied to facts similar to those of Brophy v. Cities Serv. Co., 31 Del. Ch. 241, 70 A.2d 5 (1949).
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common law action for breach of fiduciary duty is not the best vehicle
for the regulation of insider trading in the national securities markets:
the appropriate remedy is a corporate cause of action under federal
law. Such a federal statute need not espouse the controversial corpo-
rate asset theory of Diamond, which was necessary to bring the insiders'
abuse within the domain of fiduciary liability under state law. Nor
must a federal statute require or even presuppose that insider trading
injures the corporation. If the purpose of the remedy is deterrence,
rather than compensation, it is relatively unimportant who is benefited
by the inside trader's punishment.61
Some may argue that it can be unjust to permit a corporation to
benefit from the wrongful acts of persons affiliated with it,62 but this
reasoning assumes that compensation of losing market traders is the
goal of insider trading regulation. The goals of deterrence, disgorge-
ment, and punishment are all equally served as long as someone brings
the lawsuit against the insiders, no matter who is awarded the judg-
ment. In theory, a corporate recovery benefits the corporation's current
shareholders. Although these parties may have been spared the loss
suffered by losing market traders, it is important to bear in mind that,
unless the losing market traders were also induced traders, their injury
was not caused by insider trading where the corporation had a legiti-
mate reason for secrecy. The benefit to the current shareholders from a
corporate recovery may be fortuitous, but it is no more fortuitous than
In Brophy the inside information consisted of knowledge that the company was about to embark
on a program of purchasing its own shares. An employee bought in anticipation of a resulting
price rise. It appears that the price rise was caused by actual purchases by the company in the
open market, and not simply by its announcement of intentions. ld. at 243,70 A.2d at 7. If this is
true, the shares that the employee purchased at a lower price were shares the company could have
purchased at that price had the employee abstained. On these facts, it is quite plausible to con-
clude that the company lost an amount equal to the employee's profit. Unfortunately, in the more
typical fact situation, the inside information is not an asset that can be used by the corporation to
its pecuniary advantage without itself violating the securities laws, and here the misuse-of-a-cor-
porate-asset theory has a rather makeweight appearance. In particular, it becomes impossible to
relate the amount of the insider's unfair profit to any damage supposedly suffered by the corpora-
tion. But Gf United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) (purchase of target company
shares by employees of investment banker representing acquiring company violates rule l0b-5
through employees' fraudulent breach of duty to their employer and its clients; O'Connor & As-
socs. v. Dean Witter Raynolds, Inc., 529 F.Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (relying on the breach of a
Newman duty to the employer and its clients to find a rule lOb-5 claim against inside traders in
losing market traders).
61. In the 50 years of its existence, section 16(b) has been subject to some rather severe criti-
cism, see, eg., FED. SEC. CODE § 1714 Comment 1 (1980), but little of it has been aimed at the
section's creation of a corporate recovery absent any showing of harm to the corporation.
62. For example, where the expense of proration is unwarranted, and if the award would not
be "inequitable," a court may award the damages won in a FSC section 1704 suit to the corpora-
tion. FED. SEC. CODE § 17110)(2) (1980).
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the benefit to most losing market traders who would recover under the
FSC scheme. Furthermore, insofar as the corporation has an interest
in discouraging trading by insiders,63 it has a special incentive to secure
their punishment.64 When the offending insider is a director or an of-
ficer, the corporate action may be more likely to take the form of a
shareholder's derivative suit rather than the form of a direct suit by the
corporation for recovery of the unfair profit. In other cases, however, a
direct suit seems quite likely even without shareholder prodding, and
the degree of enforcement may in fact increase, because the board of
directors is more likely than company outsiders to discover the illegal
activity.
In the typical case under the FSC, individual small traders will
recover only a nominal amount. Therefore, the apportioned-claim ap-
proach of the FSC relies significantly for its enforcement on the attor-
neys' fees incentive of a class action.65 The drafters apparently assume
that, notwithstanding the limited recovery and the procedural obsta-
cles, attorneys will be willing to bring the actions in the hope of recov-
ering their fees out of the claim. The attorneys' fees incentive is also
important in a system that provides a corporate cause of action against
inside traders. Such a system must rely substantially on private attor-
neys to "find" a shareholder who is antagonistic to management, and
who will agree to institute a derivative action with attorneys' fees paya-
ble out of the corporate recovery.66 A derivative action created by fed-
eral statute, however, would not include the difficulties of notice, proof
of claim, apportionment, and distribution that are inherent in the FSC
approach, nor need it contain the procedural roadblocks of many state
statutes. Moreover, where the board members have not been involved
in the illegal trading, the procedures attendant to a derivative action
may be avoided in a direct suit by the corporation.
Because the FSC approach and the corporate claim approach both
rely heavily on the attorneys' fees incentive, it does not seem likely that
the former will achieve any greater degree of enforcement than the lat-
63. Though difficult to ascertain, it is certainly possible that insider trading injures the corpo-
ration's reputation, as suggested in Diamond. See supra text accompanying note 58. In addition,
insider trading might cause problems in the internal workings of a corporation, such as delays in
internal communication of information, competition and distrust among employees with access to
privileged information, and information distortion. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on
Internal Efflciency of the Large Corporations, 80 MICH. L. REv. 1501 (1982).
64. But see Dooley, supra note 1, at 44-46 (no general demand from corporations for the
enforcement of insider trading regulations).
65. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231, 241 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751
(1943); FED. SEC. CODE § 1708(c) Comment 2 (1980).
66. See, ag., Knauss, supra note 7, at 59; Note, supra note 18, at 298; Note, supra note 8, at
314; Comment, Pandora'r Box, supra note 7, at 416 & n.59.
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ter. Moreover, the corporate claim approach is not burdened by the
procedural difficulties that accompany the individual class claim, nor
will it ignite as much investor grumbling about the paucity of damages.
In short, when insider trading takes place during a period in which the
corporation has a legitimate business purpose for keeping the informa-
tion secret, compensation of market losers is not an appropriate goal of
the regulatory scheme and cannot be achieved by the class action ap-
proach of the FSC. A claim solely in the corporation to recover the
amount of the insider's unfair profit or some multiple thereof would
serve the goals of deterrence, disgorgement, and punishment at least as
well as the class action approach, without nearly as many untoward
side effects.
III. REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING WHEN THE CORPORATION
HAS No LEGITIMATE BUSINESS NEED FOR SECRECY
Insider trading in impersonal markets may also take place while
the corporation unreasonably delays in making public the information
on which the insider trades, that is, where the corporation has no legiti-
mate business purpose for keeping the information secret, yet fails to
release it. In this case, identifiable losing market traders are injured,67
but it is the unreasonable nondisclosure rather than the insider trading
that causes the injury. Had there been timely disclosure of the infor-
mation, the market price would have adjusted to reflect its import, and
the losses suffered by persons trading in the opposite direction from the
insiders during the secrecy period would have been averted. Timely
disclosure also effectively deters insider trading because the resulting
price adjustment eliminates the insider's opportunity to profit. There-
fore, unless the reason for nondisclosure is somehow related to the in-
sider trading activity, analysis and resolution of the insider trading
problem should refer to general disclosure requirements and not to a
scheme specifically designed to regulate insider trading.
There are two types of cases to consider. First is the case in which
the nondisclosure is unrelated to insider trading. If, for example, man-
agers with authority to disseminate new and material information fail,
perhaps negligently, to disclose the information when there is no justifi-
67. Again, induced and preempted traders are directly injured by the insider trading, but it is
impossible to identify them. See supra text accompanying notes 10-11, and notes 28-30 and ac-
companying text. Moreover, preempted traders can hardly be heard to complain under these
circumstances, because timely disclosure would have preempted them even sooner. Although the
relative losses of winning market traders (lower gains) are also caused by the insider trading, see
supra text accompanying note 26, and notes 32-34 and accompanying text, their gains, like the
insiders', are also the result of the unreasonable nondisclosure. Under these circumstances, there
is no reason toconsider permitting a damages claim by winning market traders.
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able reason for secrecy, and a lower level employee, or even another
manager who is privy to the information but is not authorized to dis-
seminate it,68 trades on the information, no identifiable market loser is
harmed by the insider trading. As is the case when the corporation has
a legitimate reason for secrecy, the harm is caused by the corporation's
nondisclosure.
In the second type of case, secrecy is maintained for the purpose of
profiting through insider trading. Where officers or others in the com-
pany have authority to disclose material corporate information, but
keep the information secret and trade on it,69 it is not unreasonable to
conclude that the reason for nondisclosure is to permit profiteering in
securities transactions.70 In this case, the nondisclosure is inextricably
linked with the insider trading activity: the decision to engage in in-
sider trading causes the nondisclosure, and the nondisclosure causes
the injury to losing market traders.
In either case, losing market traders suffer a loss. In the first case,
however, the corporation's nondisclosure causes the loss, while in the
second case, the decision to engage in insider trading causes the loss. It
follows from this distinction that two kinds of remedies are appropri-
ate. Where the nondisclosure is unrelated to insider trading, the rem-
edy, if any, must be under the general disclosure provisions and against
the corporation or its wrongfully acting manager(s) who caused the in-
jury, rather than against the insider who traded. Reaping an unfair
profit is the insider's wrong; as demonstrated above,71 that wrong is
appropriately remedied by a claim in the corporation against the in-
sider for the amount of his profit, and perhaps some extra to teach him
a lesson. Market traders always take the risk that corporate managers
will not be doing their jobs correctly and on certain occasions may even
be breaking the law. If the failure to disclose injures identifiable trad-
68. This type of case would encompass all instances of insider trading by persons who are
outside the formal corporate structure but who nevertheless have access to privileged information.
69. For discussion of the distinction between a general duty in the corporation to disclose and
the obligation to abstain from trading of a person who does not have responsibility for disseminat-
ing corporate information, see Comment, CivilLiability, supra note 19, at 676-77.
70. Brudney, supra note 21, at 328; see State Teachers Retirement Bd. v. Fluor Corp., 500 F.
Supp. 278, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (wrongful purpose may be inferred from a showing that defendant
acted for personal gain), modified on other grounds, 654 F.2d 843 (2d Cir. 1981); Comment, Civil
Liability, supra note 19, at 677 (business judgment rule on timing of disclosure difficult to over-
come unless self-profit motives are present); cf. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262,
293-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (liability under rule lob-5 results from issuing false press release for pur-
pose of affecting market price to personal advantage but such purpose must be shown), rev'd, 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 53-64.
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ers, there should perhaps be a legal remedy,72 but this has nothing to do
with the regulation of insider trading.
On the other hand, if the nondisclosure is directly caused by an
insider's decision to trade and profit on the secret information, the deci-
sion to engage in insider trading causes the losing market traders'
losses. The appropriate remedy is, arguably, to permit individual
claims for compensatory damages. If compensation for such losses is
an appropriate goal, however, there is no reason in theory to limit the
total amount of the claim to the insider's illegal profit, as does the FSC.
The insider willfully commits a wrongful act that causes heavy losses to
identifiable investors-those who traded during the period in which the
information was wrongfully withheld. The investors therefore should
be compensated by the insider for the total amount of their losses.
Moreover, rapid public disclosure is a goal in these circumstances be-
cause the sooner the information becomes public knowledge, the fewer
innocent market traders will suffer losses. Because the magnitude of
the individual injuries and the number of traders injured will continue
to increase until the information is publicly released, liability for the
full amount of the ever-growing losses should be a strong incentive to
the insiders to release the information as soon as possible after effecting
their transactions.
Nevertheless, the practical implementation of a full compensation
statute poses serious problems. Actual damages to be paid by the insid-
ers will often be huge, amounting to many times their illegal profits.
Judges can be expected to rebel in cases where the insider's wrongful
act, somehow, does not look as bad as these extremely heavy penalties
would imply. More important, liability will depend on the issue of
whether there was a justifiable business reason for secrecy, because
where nondisclosure was justified, all identifiable losses are attributable
simply to ordinary investment risks, not to insider trading. In that case
compensation is irrelevant. 73 As useful as the business-reason-for-se-
crecy test is conceptually, it is often very difficult in practice to deter-
mine whether nondisclosure is justified or abusive.74 Nor will it be
clear in many cases whether the inside trader was authorized to disclose
the information, even absent a justifiable reason for secrecy. It is sound
jurisprudence to avoid making such huge liability turn on the resolu-
72. Whether the existing disclosure rules and the remedies for noncompliance with them
provide adequate investor protection is a serious problem that has yet to be fully resolved. For
discussion of the use of rule lOb-5 to require prompt disclosure ofmaterial information, see gener-
ally Bauman, supra note 23; Comment, supra note 23.
73. See su.pra text accompanying notes 25-35.
74. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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tion of these vague questions. Although the danger of strike suits is
often overemphasized, they can surely be expected to increase in
number with the size of the potential recovery, especially when the ele-
ments of the key issues are unclear.7" In the hands of courts unwilling
to levy such heavy damages, the substantive issues76 would grow in-
creasingly murky, making the law arbitrary and uneven in its applica-
tion. Moreover, fear of incurring such heavy liability could easily lead
to the premature release of information by managers seeking to protect
themselves, which might injure the corporation. 77 These practical con-
siderations argue for some limitation on damages even when the in-
sider's decision to trade has caused actual injury to identifiable market
traders.
Limiting total damages, however, to the amount of the insider's
unfair profit or some multiple thereof, as the drafters of the FSC have
done, implicitly admits that compensation of injured parties is no
longer the primary goal of the system. Any such limitation is necessar-
ily arbitrary78 and is in no way related to the amount of actual injury
suffered. Of course, the apportioned damages approach of the FSC
does award the losers something, which, all other things being equal,
seems better than nothing. But in fact all other things are not equal.
Where the insider trading has actually caused the losing market trad-
ers' losses, the losers will have all the more reason to be bitter over their
miniscule recovery. Involving them in a class action that brings high
profits to the attorneys and otherwise only reemphasizes the plaintiffs'
losses by awarding them a small fraction of their actual damages can be
expected to generate only cynicism and disdain. If the compensation
principle is to be denied, it seems best to deny it completely.
There is yet another reason to avoid a full compensation, individ-
ual-recovery scheme. The scheme's draconian liability arises from the
fact that the insider does not garner the bulk of the total profits earned
as a result of the nondisclosure. All winning market traders, who trade
in the same direction as the insider, will profit with him, although the
market winners do not realize when they trade that news favorable to
75. See Comment, Civil Liability, supra note 19, at 678.
76. These issues include: who within the corporation is authorized to disclose what types of
information; who is a proper plaintiff; what information is material; at what point is information
public whether reliance is necessary; whether motivation defenses are appropriate; and what con-
stitutes a justifiable reason for secrecy.
77. Another problem that might be expected to arise from a full compensation approach is a
reduction of share ownership by corporate insiders. Note, supra note 8, at 308; Comment, Civil
Liability, supra note 19, at 678. But see Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494, 499, 248 N.E.2d
910, 913, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 82 (1969).
78. Pozen, supra note 40, at 364.
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their transaction is imminent. While it is true that the winning market
traders do not gain as much as is lost by the market losers (the differ-
ence being the amount of the unfair profit reaped by the insider), it is
nevertheless possible to view as an ordinary trading risk the chance that
an investor's purchase or sale may occur at a time when material infor-
mation that should have been disclosed has not yet been made public.
If it is true that insider profits are usually only a small percentage of the
winning market traders' total profit, the outside winners' gains will
equal a high percentage of the losing market traders' losses. This
makes it look very much like an investment-risk injury. There will be
some winners and some losers, with outsiders generally losing more
often than they win because the knowledgeable insiders are always
trading in the profitable direction. Yet, the risk of loss is not radically
different from other kinds of investment risk. Therefore, one might jus-
tifiably hesitate to invite the jurisprudential problems implied by a full
compensation scheme, even when insiders trade absent a legitimate
business purpose for corporate secrecy. The regulatory scheme cover-
ing insider trading can avoid all the practical and theoretical problems
attendant to a full compensation approach if it simply gives to the cor-
poration the sole claim for disgorgement of the illegal profit, or some
multiple thereof, in all cases. Liability in this amount is necessary and
desirable because the profit is unfair and the trading adtivity illegal
whether or not there is good reason for secrecy. The problem of
prompt disclosure when there is a good reason for secrecy, and the pen-
alties for failing to disclose promptly, are best covered by general dis-
closure provisions, since market traders are equally harmed by
unreasonable nondisclosure whether or not insiders have traded.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is incorrect to say that compensation of innocent market traders
is never a legitimate goal of a scheme regulating insider trading activi-
ties. Injured parties whose losses are causally related to the illegal in-
sider trading can be easily identified. Such identifiable injuries,
however, are limited to cases in which insiders have traded while delib-
erately and unjustifiably withholding material information, and in this
case, the more fundamental problem is disclosure, not insider trading.
Moreover, even where it is theoretically warranted, compensation
raises many practical difficulties.
The vast majority of insider trading cases occur when the corpora-
tion does have a legitimate purpose for keeping the information secret.
In such cases, compensation is unwarranted because insider trading ac-
tivity causes no damage to any identifiable market traders. Therefore, it
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seems best to treat all insider trading activity as a moral wrong that
should be deterred and punished. Problems concerning corporate dis-
closure should be left to those provisions of the regulatory scheme that
deal directly with disclosure duties, and private rights of action in indi-
vidual investors for damages from insider trading should be expressly
denied. The sole private claim-for the amount of the insider's unfair
profit plus such additional amounts or multiples thereof as are deemed
necessary for an adequate balance of deterrence and punishment-
should be recognized in the corporation whose securities are the subject
of the illegal trading activity.

